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Abstract
We study the effects of loans and mortgages securitisation on business cycles by using a large-scale
agent-based stock-flow consistent macroeconomic model and simulator, that we enriched by including
a financial vehicle corporation (FVC), that buys loans and mortgages from banks and issues ABSs
and MBSs, and a mutual fund, that invests both in ABSs and MBSs. Households own the equity of
the mutual fund in the form of equity shares. By means of securitisation, banks conduct regulatory
capital arbitrage and reduce risk weighted assets in their balance sheet, in order to lend more loans
and mortgages. Results show that different levels of securitisation propensity are able to affect credit
and business cycles in different manners. On one side, securitisation increases banks lending activity,
influencing positively investment and consumption. On the onther side, the increased amount of credit
amplifies the negative shocks, due to higher loans write-offs probability, triggered by the boosted leding
activity. Firms’ bankruptcies impact the equity of banks, affecting their ability to grant new loans to
consumption goods producers (CGPs), which need credit for their production activity, and mortgages
to households, which are not able to purchase housing units. CGPs soon go bankrupt and households
see their capital income reduced. The predominance of one effect on the other depends on the level of
securitisation propensity and the time span considered.
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1. Introduction
This work studies the impact of securitisation on credit and business cycle using a macroeconomic
agent-based and stock-flow consistent model. Our aim is to show how securitisation process deeply
modifies the balance sheet structure of banks with the effect of boosting lending activity, thus in-
creasing consumption and investment, but also making the banking system less resiliant to endogeous
crises, resulting in more credit rationing that trigger firms bankruptcy cascades, worsening economic
performance. Increasing the securitisation propensity, the second effect prevails on the first one.
Securitisation consists in the financial practice of pooling illiquid assets, such as mortgages and
loans, and transforming them into tradable securities, i.e. mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and
asset-backed securities (ABSs), more liquid than the underlying loans or receivables, which are sold to
interested investors. Securitisation allows credit insitutions to remove risky assets from their balance
sheets and consequently to overcome regulatory capital requirements and increase their source of
funding.
In a broader view, securitisation can be considered as the core of the so-called shadow banking
system, defined by the Financial Stability Board as “the system of credit intermediation that involves
entities and activities outside the regular banking system” (FSB (2011)). Shadow banking system
includes a multitude of actors and several layers of intermediation. Pozsar et al. (2010) describes in
details shadows banks and their relationship with the traditional financial system. Shadow banking
system has been listed as one of the main causes of the global financial crisis of 2007 - 2009 (Lysandrou
and Nesvetailova (2014), Adrian and Shin (2010)), enhancing the efforts to find more efficient regulatory
responses (see Gorton and Metrick (2010), Nersisyan and Wray (2010)).
Only few studies propose stock-flow consistent models of the shadow banking system or some of its
components, focusing on the securitisation process and its role in influencing financial and real sectors.
Fontana and Godin (2013) study the effects of securitisation on banks balance sheet and housing
market, showing how securitisation process can lead to inflation balloons on security market driven by
demand for deposits by speculative households and sales of mortgage-backed securities in the secondary
market. In Bhaduri et al. (2015), authors show how securitisation expands credit and derivative trade
leading to economic boom, but also increasing the fragility of the banking system, driven by the
internal fragility of the finance sector arising from its growing internal scarcity of liquidity. A stock-
flow consistent model that includes securitisation process is developed also by Nikolaidi (2015), pointing
out that the combination of risky financial practices with wage stagnation can increase the likelihood
of financial instability in a macro system. Moreover Botta et al. (2016), following a post-keynesian
stock-flow consistent approach (Lavoie and Godley (2012) and Caverzasi and Godin (2015)), provide
a model of shadow banking system analysing its impact on the whole economy from a macroeconomic
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perspective, showing how banks, before the crisis, were able to increase the issuance of mortgages while
apparently keeping their financial position stable, leading to an increase in the financial instability and
that securitisation process makes legislations on capital requirement not only ineffective, but also
potentially counterproductive.
We study the functioning and the effects of the securitisation mechanism using the EURACE agent-
based and stock-flow consistent macroceconomic simulator. We analyse the effects of the securitisation
accross the whole credit cycle and the consequent impact on the business cycle. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that includes securitisation process in a large-scale agent-based model,
characterised by several classes of economic agents that interact through differets markets, namely
markets for consumption goods and capital goods, a housing market, a labor market, a credit market
and a financial market for stocks and government bonds.
The main advantage of the agent-based approach is that it allows the study of the emergent aggre-
gate statistical regularities in the economy, which are not originated by the behaviour of an “average”
individual, but are the result of agents behaviour and interactions. For instance, firms are heteroge-
neous, among other things, in terms of degree of financial fragility. This type of heterogeneity plays a
crucial role in the evolution over time of aggregate variables such as production and unemployment.
Moreover, small idiosyncratic shocks at firm-level may generate single firm bankruptcies, which cause
credit rationing by banks and so waves of bankruptcies among firms, then inducing large aggregate
fluctuations in the economy. This process plays a crucial role when we introduce securitisation, since
banks can exploit regulatory capital arbitrage to lend more, increasing the amount of credit in the
economy and thus making bankruptcies more likely.
In order to study the securitisation process, EURACE financial sector has been enriched with the
implementation of a financial vehicle corporation (FVC) and a mutual fund. The FVC buys loans
and mortgages from banks and issues ABSs and MBSs in order to fund its purchases, while mutual
fund purchases ABSs and MBSs. Banks decide the amount of credit to securitise endogenously. Being
lending activity constrained by a minimum capital requirement, banks can avoid the capital constraints
by selling loans or mortgages to the FVC. This is an opportunity to free up their balance sheet from
credit and their related risk and, consequently, lend more.
Results show that securitisation mechanism is able to impact the business cycle. In the short
run, banks securitise their assets, thus reducing the risk weighted assets and lending more loans and
mortgages. Credit increases, as well as the capital income of households that receive the profits of the
mutual fund in the form of dividends. Investment and consumption are influenced positively by the
new credit triggered by securitisation. However, the increased amount of credit amplifies the negative
shock in the medium and long run, due to higher loans write-offs probability, triggered by the boosted
leding activity in the short run. Firms’ bankruptcies impact the equity of banks, affecting their ability
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to grant new loans to consumption goods producers (CGPs), which need credit for their production
activity, and mortgages to households, which are not able to purchase housing units. CGPs soon go
bankrupt and households see their capital income reduced. The amplitude of securitisation impact to
the economy depends on the size of the securitisation availment itself. High securitisation propensity
triggers an economic boom in the short-run but increases significantly the fragility of the economy in
the long run. Low amount of securitisation, instead, can have positive effects both in the short and
long run.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of emprical and theoretical
literature related to securitisation. In section 3, we introduce the baseline EURACE model with a
particular emphasis on the single agents’ and sectiorial balance sheets based on stock-flow consistency
approach. In section 4, securitisation mechanism is described in details and the new EURACE agents,
namely financial vehicle corporation (or special purpose vehicle) and mutual fund, are presented. In
section 5 we show the results of computational experiments. Section 6 concludes the paper with final
remarks.
2. Securitisation in empirical and theoretical literature
In the introduction, we have listed some stock-flow consistent models of securitisation and stated
the main advantages given by the agent-based approach in order to catch some relevant effects of
securitisation process. However, besides stock-flow consistent modelling approaches, an increasing
attention has been paid by several empirical and theoretical studies to the securitisation activity in the
last decades. In this section, we provide a survey of literature, focusing on the benefits and costs of
securitisation, on the securitisation impact at micro and macro level and on the role of securitisation
in the last great financial crisis, explaining how our work fits in this debate.
Securitisation market exploded during the 1980s and kept growing in next decades. In Europe,
securitisation market peaked before the last great crisis, with a total of e818 billions in new asset-
backed securities issuance in 2008. Demand for these assets plummeted after 2008 because of the
deterioration in the rating of the collateral behind the various types of ABSs. At the end of 2016 the
outstanding amount of European securitised assets was e1.5 trillion. For comparison, at its peak in
2008, the overall outstanding amount of the ABS market reached more than e2.2 trillion 1. According
to the literature, securitisation has benefits and costs. On one side, banks can use securitisation
for conducting regulatory capital arbitrage, by reducing their regulatory capital requirements and
lend more (Jones (2000), Ambrose et al. (2005)). Moreover, securitisation represents a useful risk
management tool for banks because it provides an additional source of funds and increases banks’
1Data Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
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lending ability (see Loutskina (2011)). On the other side, securitisation enhances systemic risk, by
reducing banks’ incentives to screen loans ex-ante and monitoring after lending (Keys et al. (2010)).
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) study the full equilibrium dynamics of an economy with financial
frictions. They find that securitization and financial innovations include tools that, even if designed
to better manage risks at individual level, may increase systemic risk. Another source of systemic risk
can be, as stated in Wagner (2007), that banks use the liquidity gained by selling and hedging loans
using derivative instruments, to take more risk in primary markets, arising banking instability and the
externalities associated with banking failures.
Regarding the securitisation impact at micro and macro level, so far the literature on securitisation
and structured finance has been mainly focused on micro level. In particular, a lot of attention has been
paid to risk-taking and transfer (Instefjord (2005), Chiesa (2008), Acharya et al. (2013)), tranching
of derivative securities (Plantin (2004) and DeMarzo (2005)), the role of collaterals for fiscal (Gorton
and Ordonez (2013)) and monetary policies (Singh (2013)), as well as the importance of computing
margin requirements for risky collateral in the repo market including systemic risk (Lillo and Pirino
(2015)).
In the aftermath of the last great crisis, the debate on the role of securitisation has been particularly
lively. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) study the negative role of securitisation in the deterioration
of loans’ quality before the last financial crisis of 2008, providing also evidence that the rise and fall
of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario, in which unsustainable
growth leads to the collapse of the market. The study of Gorton and Metrick (2012) shows, using
empirical data, that securitisation led higher uncertainty about bank solvency, increasing the repo
haircuts making the U.S. banking system insolvent during the last great financial crisis. Di Patti and
Sette (2016) analyse italian data and show that the degree to which banks tightened credit supply
to nonfinancial firms during crisis is positively related to the share of loans they securitized before
the crisis, resulting in lower credit growth, higher interest rates, lower probability of accepting loan
applications and inability of firms to fully compensate the negative credit supply shocks. Despite
its negative facade, mainly due to the speculative purpose followed by several financial actors before
the financial crisis, sustainable securitisation has been indicated as a resource of funding for firms
or households (see Segoviano et al. (2013)). Moreover, Bertay et al. (2016) emphasizes the positive
correlation of firms’ loans securitisation with the economic activity. Among its role as source of funding,
a transparent securitisation could also help investors, allowing them to diversify their portfolios in terms
of risk and return, leading to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution
of risk (BoE and ECB (2014)). Fujii (2012) suggests regulatory solutions at individual level and
extensive reporting requirements of financial institutions in order to mitigate systemic risk.
In this paper, we do not want to focus on the individual banks decisions, but we analyze how
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securitisation affects business cycle, trying to explain how securitisation can impact economic activity,
either in a positive or negative way. The channels linking securitisation and real economy are mainly
twofold (see Bertay et al. (2016) and the related literature). The first one is the change in credit
volume of the economy, that can result in more consumption for households and more funds for
investments for firms. However, excess use of securitisation can lead to bankruptcies and worsen
economic permormance. The second one regards the credit quality, i.e. securitisation would help
banks to reduce its constrains and allocate capital in the economy in a more efficient way, favoring
the flows of capital to most productive firms while sharing the risk among investors. Also in this case,
scholars do not completely agree. For instance, Pennacchi (1988) suggests that banks after seucritising
are not interested in ensuring the good quality of the borrowers. In our model we focus on the credit
volume channel and we do not pay our attention on the quality of the borrowers in banks lending
decision.
3. EURACE baseline model
The EURACE agent-based model and simulator represents a fully integrated macroeconomy com-
posed by several agents that act following behavioural rules and interact through various markets.
The model was created during 2006-2009 under the FP6 European Funded Project “EURACE” and
since then has been developed to date and strongly improved in the last three years under the FP7
European Funded Project “SYMPHONY”(see Teglio et al. (2015), Ozel et al. (2016), Raberto et al.
(2016), Ponta et al. (2016)). In the model, agents’ decision processes are characterized by bounded
rationality and limited capabilities of computation and information gathering; thus, agents’ behav-
ior follows adaptive rules derived from the management literature about firms and banks, and from
experimental economics literature about the behavior of consumers and financial investors.
Moreover, agents interact in different types of markets, i.e. markets for consumption goods and
capital goods, labor market, credit market and financial market for stocks and government bonds.
In the Eurace ABM model, markets represent the place where agents interact. Markets are based
on a decentralized exchange with pairwise trading and price dispersion, except for financial market
where a centralized Walrasian auctioneer operates and a single price is set at the intersection of the
demand and supply curves. In decentralized markets, prices are set by agents on the supply side, by
considering a mark-up on unit costs. For a detailed description of agents’ behaviors about decision
making hypotheses in real (consumption goods and labor) markets as well as in credit markets see
Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al. (2010); Cincotti et al. (2012); Teglio et al. (2015).
The baseline EURACE model includes:
• Households (HHs): they act as consumers and workers. Households buy homogeneous consump-
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tion goods from consumption goods producers according to their consumption budget and provide
a homogeneous labour force to consumption goods producers. Households can invest in the stock
and in the government bond markets. The saving-consumption decision is modelled according to
the theory of buffer-stock saving behaviour, which states that households consumption depends
on a precautionary saving motive, determined by a target level of wealth to income ratio (Carroll,
2001; Deaton, 1992). Households can invest their savings in the asset market, by buying and
selling equity shares or government bonds. Households’ portfolio allocation is modeled according
to a preference structure designed to take into account the psychological findings emerged in the
framework of behavioral finance and in particular of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Households’ behavior in the financial market has been
thoroughly described in Raberto et al. (2008) and Teglio et al. (2009).
• Consumption goods producers (CGPs): they employ labour and capital goods to produce a
homogeneous consumption good according to their production plan. CGPs act as price setters
in the sale markets and supply their output following a short-term profit maximizing behaviour.
Prices are set considering a mark-up on unit costs. CGPs are characterized by a short-term profit
objective and make production and investment plans where expected future revenues are based
on backward-looking expectations determined by past sales and prices. In particular, production
plans depend on past sales and the inventory stock, along the lines of the inventory management
literature (Hillier and Lieberman, 1986), while sale prices are determined by a mark-up on costs
(wages and debt interests), see. e.g. Plott and Sunder (1982); Fabiani et al. (2006). Investment
plans depend on the cost of capital goods and the present value2 of the additional foreseen
revenues, but are limited by both by internal3 and external financing capabilities4. CGPs can
also borrow money from banks in order to pay production factors and make investments. They
are modelled as corporations whose share are public and traded in the stock market. CGPs can
also issue new share to finance their activities if rationed in the credit market. If CGPs end with
a net worth (equity) below zero they are considered bankrupt. In this case the producer exits
the economy, its employees are laid off, shareholders wiped-out, and its debt is partially written
off causing a loss for the lending bank as well. However, a new producer of the same type enters
the economy after a lag period with the physical capital inherited from the bankrupted one.
• Capital goods producer (KGP): There is just one type of technology for capital goods. Capital
2According to empirical surveys (Graham and Harvey, 2001, 2002), the net present value is one of the most popular
method used by managers to evaluate investments.
3Along the lines of (Fazzari et al., 2008).
4The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) is adopted to determine a hierarchy of financial sources for the
firm
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goods are produced on request and therefore do not generate inventories.
• Banks (Bs): Banks supply loans to CGPs to finance their operations and mortgages to households
that want purchase housing units, collect private sector deposits (i.e., the liquidity of all private
agents) and may borrow from the central bank if in shortage of liquidity through a standing
facility. Lending activity by banks is constrained by a minimum capital requirement and depends
also on the evaluation of the balance sheet of the borrower. In the market for loans, CGPs apply
for credit first to their preferred bank, then if rationed to another selected bank. If CGPs are
rationed by both their preferred bank and by a second bank, they will be forced to cut their
dividend payment. It is worth noting that, in line with the working of the banking system in a
modern capitalist economy (see e.g. McLeay et al. (2014)), banks lending is not limited by the
available liquidity and, whenever a bank grants a loan, a corresponding deposit, entitled to the
borrower, is created on the liability side of the bank’ balance sheet.
• Government (G): Government is responsible for the fiscal and welfare policies. The income of the
government is given by corporate tax, value-added tax, capital income tax (dividends and bond
coupons) and labour tax. The tax payments are done by CGPs, KGP, banks and households and
the government budget income is calculated as the sum of all tax payments. Taxes are collected
on a monthly basis, while tax rates are revised yearly. Regarding government’s expenditures,
they include wages for households employed in the public sector, that are set as fixed percentage
of the total households, unemployment benefits, transfers and repayment of the government debt
(bond coupons). The government observes its budget balance (payment account MG) every
month and if MG < 0 the government has a budget deficit which can be financed by issuing
new government bonds, that are sold to the households. The Government computes its budget
deficit once per month, but enters in the bond market on a daily basis. The reason is that if
the Government enters in the bond market only once per month there is insufficient demand for
the bonds, so the Government may fail to attain its liquidity target. Thus the monthly budget
deficit will be financed by bonds on a monthly basis, but there is a smoothing across the month.
• Central Bank (CB): The central bank is the responsible for the monetary policy. It sets the
policy rate, which is the cost of liquidity provided to banks. The short-term nominal interest
rate follows the Taylor rule (see Taylor (1993) for a discussion) and is set as:
rcb = pi + api(pi − p˜i) + aυ(υ¯ − υ) (1)
where pi is the yearly inflation rate for a current month, p˜i is the desired rate of inflation, υ is
the unemployment rate for a current month, and υ¯ mimics the natural rate of unemployment,
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or the full-employment rate (that we exogenously set to 0 for simplicity). This version of the
Taylor rule departs from the standard one for its use of the unemployment rate instead of the
output. The two measures are strongly interconnected and the unemployment gap is certainly
a satisfactory indicator of economic recession. Another role of the central bank is the provision
of a standing facility to grant liquidity in infinite supply to commercial banks, when they are in
short supply.
EURACE stocks and flows matrices
Each agent is characterized by a double-entry balance sheet with a detailed account of all monetary
and real assets as well as monetary liabilities. Monetary and real flows given by agents’ behaviours
and interactions determine the period by period balance sheet dynamics. A stock-flow model is then
created and used to check that all monetary and real flows are accounted for, and that all changes
to stock variables are consistent with these flows (see Raberto et al. (2012); Cincotti et al. (2012) for
further details). According to the “stock-flow consistency” approach used in Lavoie and Godley (2012)
and post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent modeling (see Caverzasi and Godin (2015) for a survey), we
present four significant matrices that provide an exhaustive description of the model. Table 1 is the
agent class balance sheet, i.e. the asset and liability entries of each particular agent type. Table 2
represents the balance sheet matrix, describing all assets and liabilities for each sector (here a sector
has to be seen as a class of agents). Table 3, called transaction flow matrix, shows all the stock and
monetary flows among agents. Table 4, called revaluation matrix, reports for each sector the variations
in the stock level that are not due to flows but to changes in the stock price.
In matrix 2 a plus (minus) sign corresponds to agents’ assets (liabilities) and each column can be
read as the aggregated balance sheet of a specific sector (e.g. households). Rows show assets and
claims of assets among sectors, thus generally adding up to zero. Exceptions are capital and invento-
ries, which are accumulated by CGPs, and households’ equity shares, which are issued by CGPs, KGP
and banks and do not add up to zero because of the difference between market price and book value.
In table 3, the current account describes the flows of revenues (plus sign) and payments (minus
sign) that agents get and make. Agents are reported in the columns and monetary flows are reported
in the rows. The result of agents’ sector transactions is the net cash flow. The capital account section
of table 3 describes the balance sheets changes related to each sector.
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Money creation
The central bank has two channels to introduce new liquidity (or fiat money) into the system:
• Via loans provided to banks when they are in liquidity shortage
• Through quantitative easing operations, i.e., purchase of government bonds from households in
the secondary market
In both cases, the economic agents deposit an amount equal to the new fiat money in the banking
sector, generating additional liquidity that is deposited at the central bank and, in turn, generates
new liquidity of the central bank that is always equal to the amount of fiat money created. This is the
reason why in table 2, the difference between fiat money and central bank liquidity is always constant
and equal to the initial central bank liquidity. Moreover, money supply in the economy can variate
independently from the fiat money created by the central bank, because it endogenously raises every
time a bank grants a new loan and it decreases when the loan is paid back. Securitisation process is
able to increase the money supply through the market channel, exploiting the possibility of the banks
to sell loans and mortgages to FVC that in turn issue ABSs and MBSs, sold to the mutual fund. In this
way the risk related to the credit granted by the banks is shared with the mutual fund. Through the
capital arbitrage, banks are able to avoid capital requirements and grant more credit, thus increasing
the endogenous money supply.
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Table 1: Agent class balance sheets
Agent class Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity: Mh Mortgages: Uh
abbrev.: HH Stock portfolio: Equity: Eh
index : h = 1, . . . , NHous ΣbnEh,bpEb+
ΣfnEh,f pEf+
nEh,K pEK +
nEh,DpED
Gov Bonds: nh,G pG
Housing units: Xh
Consumption Goods Producer Liquidity: Mf Debt: Df =
∑
b `f,b
abbrev.: CGP Capital goods: Kf Equity: Ef
index : f = 1, . . . , NFirm Inventories: If
Capital Goods Producer Liquidity: MK Equity: EK
abbrev.: KGP
Financial Vehicle Corporation Liquidity: MV Asset backed securities (ABSs): ABSV
abbrev.: V Loans: LV Mortgage backed securities (MBSs):MBSV
Mortgages: UV Equity: EV
Mutual Fund Liquidity: MD Equity: ED
abbrev.: D Asset backed securities (ABSs): ABSD
Mortgage backed securities (MBSs):
MBSD
Bank Liquidity: Mb Deposits :
abbrev.: B Db =
∑
hMb,h +
∑
f Mb,f +Mb,K
index : b = 1, . . . , NBank Loans: Lb =
∑
f `b,f CB standing facility: Db = `b,CB
Mortgages: Ub =
∑
h Ub,h Equity: Eb
nEb,V pEV
Government Liquidity: MG
Outstanding government bonds value :
DG = nG pG
abbrev.: G Equity: EG
Central Bank Liquidity: MCB Outstanding fiat money: FiatCB
abbrev.: CB Loans to banks: LCB =
∑
b `CB,b Deposits: DCB =
∑
bMb +MG
Gov Bonds: nCB,G pG Equity: ECB
Balance sheets of any agent class characterizing the Eurace economy. Balance sheet entries in the table have a
subscript character, that is the index of an agent in the class to which the variable refers. In some cases, we
can find two subscript characters, where the second one refers to the index of an agent in another class where
there is the balance-sheet counterpart. For instance, Df refers to the total debt of firm f , i.e. a liability, and
Lb refers to the aggregate loans of bank b, i.e. an asset. `f,b (or `b,f ) refer to the loans granted by banks
b to firms f . Of course,
∑
b Lb =
∑
f `b,f represents an aggregate balance sheet identity, that is verified along
the entire simulation. nEh,x represent the number of outstanding equity shares of agents x held by households
h. The market price of the equity shares is given by pEx . The stock portfolio’s value of household h is then
computed as:
∑
x nEh,xpEx . Government bonds’ number and market price are given by nG and pG, respectively.
11
Sectors
Non-Financial Private Agents Financial Private Agents Banks Policy Makers
HHs CGPs KGP V D Bs G CB Σ
Housing units +XH pX +XH pX
Capital +KF pK +KF pK
Inventories +IF pc +IF pc
Government Bonds +nHG pG –nG pG +n
CB
G pG 0
Debt / Credit –Mortgages –Loans
+Loans
+Mortgages
–LoansCB
+LoansCB 0
Securitised Loans
+LoansV
+MortgagesV
–LoansV
–MortgagesV
0
ABSs , MBSs
–ABSV
–MBSV
+ABSD
+MBSD
0
Private Liquidity +MH +MF +MK +MV +MD –DB 0
Banks, Government
Liquidity
+MB +MG –DCB 0
CB Liquidity /
Fiat Money
+MCB
–FiatCB
+MCB,0
Traded Equity
+ΣfnEf
pEf
+nEk
pEk
+nED
pED
+ΣbnEb
pEb
–EF
–EK
–EV
–ED
+nEV
pEV
–EB
+ΣfnEf
pEf
− EF
+nEk
pEk
− EK
+nEV
pEV
− EV
+nED
pED
− ED
+ΣbnEb
pEb
− EB
Equity –EH –EG –ECB −EH − EG − ECB
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Sectorial balance sheet matrix. Subscripts represent the index of the agent to which the stock refers. Uppercase subscripts are used when the stock refers to
a whole sector, whereas lowercase subscripts are used when it refers to a single agent (for instance in the case of sums). Finally, superscript characters are introduced
when the balance sheet counterpart is more than one single sector.
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HHs CGPs KGP V D Bs G CB
CB money
creation
Σ
Current
Account
Consumption – + 0
Wages + – – – 0
Transfers + – 0
Investment – + 0
Taxes – – – – + 0
Dividends + – – – – –/+ 0
Securitisation Interest + – 0
ABSs/MBSs coupons – + 0
Bond coupons + – + 0
CB coupons payback + – 0
Banks interests – – + 0
CB loans interests – + 0
CB interests payback + – 0
= = = = = = = =
Net cash flow Savings Profits Profits Profits Profits Profits Surplus Seignoirage 0
Capital
Account
Net cash flow +Savings +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Surplus +Seignoirage 0
∆ Loans /
Mortgages
+∆ Mortgages +∆ Loans
–∆ Loans
–∆ Mortgages
+∆ LoansCB
–∆ LoansCB 0
∆ Issue of new
shares / bonds
–Σf pEf
∆nEf
–pEG
∆nEG
+Σf pEf
∆nEf
+pEG
∆nEG
0
∆ Securitized loans /
mortgages
+∆ LoansV
+∆ MortgagesV
– ∆ LoansV
– ∆ MortgagesV
0
∆ Issue of ABSs/MBSs
+ ∆ ABSV
+ ∆ MBSV
–∆ ABSD
– ∆ MBSD
0
∆ Quantitative easing +pEG
∆n
QE
EG
–pEG
∆n
QE
EG
0
∆ Private Liquidity
& ∆ Banks’ deposits
–∆ MH –∆ MF –∆ MK –∆ MV –∆ MD +∆ DB 0
∆ Banks/Pub. Liq.
& ∆ CB deposits
–∆ MB –∆ MG +∆ DCB 0
∆ CB Liq. /
∆ Fiat Money
–∆ MCB +∆ FiatCB 0
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3: Sectorial transaction flow matrix of agents populating the EURACE economy
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HHs CGPs KGP V D Bs G CB Σ
Equityt−1 EH,t−1 EF,t−1 EK,t−1 EV,t−1 ED,t−1 EB,t−1 EG,t−1 ECB,t−1 ETOT,t−1
Net cash flow +Savings +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Profits +Surplus +Seignoirage 0
Revaluations/
Devaluations
Housing units +Σh∆pXXh +Σh∆pXXh
Capital +Σf∆pKKf +Σf∆pKKf
Inventories +Σf∆pcIf +Σf∆pcIf
Equity shares
+Σf∆pEf
nEf
+Σb∆pEb
nEb
+∆pEk
nEk
+∆pEv
nEv
+∆pEd
nEd
+Σf∆pEf
nEf
+Σb∆pEb
nEb
+∆pEk
nEk
+∆pEv
nEv
+∆pEd
nEd
Bonds +∆pGn
H
G –∆pGnG +∆pGn
CB
G
0
= = = = = = = = =
Equity EH,t EF,t EK,t EV,t ED,t EB,t EG,t ECB,t ETOT,t
Table 4: Sectorial revaluation matrix of agents populating the EURACE economy.
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4. Securitisation and money market creation
In order to study the securitisation mechanism, EURACE baseline model has been enriched with
the addition of two agents:
• Financial Vehicle Corporation (FVC): It carries out securitisation transactions. The role of
FVC is the transformation of banks loans and mortgages in asset-backed securities (ABSs) and
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). In particular, banks sell to the FVC loans and mortgages
that they want to put off their balance sheet. In order to fund banks’ credit purchase, FVC
creates pools of loans and mortgages and issues ABSs and/or MBSs.
• Mutual fund (D): It represents the demand side of ABSs and MBSs. It has an initial provision of
liquidity that it uses to support the securitisation mechanism throught securitised assets purchase.
Together with the purchase of asset-backed securities and mortgage-backed securities, it receives
the right to collect the cash flows related to the securitised credit, i.e. principals and interests.
Its equity is owned by households, that receive the profit of the fund in the form of dividends.
Securitisation mechanism empowers banks to sell loans and household mortgages to the financial
vehicle corporation (FVC), which can transfer them out of their balance sheet by issuing ABSs and
MBSs, sold to the mutual fund. Thus banks are able to free their balance sheets from loans and
mortgages and their related risk. The relevance of securitisation process in EURACE is due to the
presence in the model of a realistic banks’ capital requirement provision that mimics Basel II/III
regulations. In particular, the amount of banks’ risk weighted assets can not exceed a maximum level
with respect to the equity capital, in order to have a sufficient buffer to cushion possible loans and
mortgages write-offs. Thus securitisation process can be used by banks for regulatory capital arbitrage.
A detailed description of the EURACE credit market and securitisation process follows.
4.1. Credit supply
Let us consider a bank b with equity Eb and risk-weighted portfolio Wb consisting of risk weighted
loans Wb,L and mortgages Wb,U , such that:
Wb = Wb,L +Wb,U . (2)
Suppose that a consumption good producer (CGP) sends a loan request amount λf to the bank b.
Let us assume that ωλf is the risk weight of loan λf (i.e. accounts for the financial fragility of the
prospective borrower); then we set ωλf to depend on the borrower’s default probability as follows:
ωλf = 2.5(pif )
3, (3)
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where pif represents the default probability of the borrower based on its leverage, along the lines of
the Moodys KMV model (Saunders and Allen, 2010):
pif =
Df + λf
Df + λf + Ef
. (4)
Equation 3 represents a cubic function approximating the so-called Basel II internal ratings approach
(see Yeh et al. (2005)). In this way, different credit ratings are assigned to different borrowers and
the risks associated to their loans have different weights in banks balance sheet. Bank b is allowed
to lend up to the amount `bf 6 λf provided that its equity (capital base) is at least a fraction k of
Wb + ωλf `bf :
Wb + ωλf `bf 6 αEb, (5)
where α is the inverse of k, i.e. α = 1/k.
Besides CGP, households can send credit requests to banks. Whenever they enter in the housing
market, they can buy house units and, in case their liquidity is lower than the offered price, they ask
for a mortgage (see Ozel et al. (2016)). Let us assume that Ûbh is the mortgage asked by the potential
borrower (household h) to the bank b. Bank b can grant the mortgage amount Ûbh to household h only
if its capital requirement is satisfied, following the same condition expressed in equation 5 for loans to
CGP:
Wb + ωÛhÛbh 6 αEb. (6)
Differently from CGP loans, risk weight of household mortgages ωÛh is assumed constant and equal
to 0.5.
However, a flow control measure, namely debt-service-to-income (DSTI), checks incomes and debt
payments of the household for the upcoming quarter. In particular, banks can provide mortgages only
if the total mortgage payments of the applicant are lower than a DSTI ratio of his income, i.e.
RUh +RÛh 6 DSTI(Zl + Ze) (7)
where RUh +RÛh is the quarterly payments (principal and interests) related to both present mortgages
Uh of household h and the new mortgage Ûh. Zl +Ze is the sum of quarterly labor and capital income
after taxes.
4.2. Securitisation mechanism
As stated in the equations 5 and 6, bank’s lending activity is limited by the ratio of its risk-weighted
assets and equity, according to the regulatory capital requirements. The ceiling of risk-weighted assets
16
for the bank is given by α times its equity capital, i.e. αEb. Thus, from a regulatory prespective,
the bank is constrained by the following rule: Wb ≤ αEb. Introducing the securitisation mechanism,
the bank can put off its balance sheet the amount of risk-weighted assets that exceeds the ceiling.
Moreover, we want to add a behavioural rule, by considering different thresholds, computed quarterly
as a fraction of the ceiling. Therefore, we introduce an exogenous securitisation propensity parameter
µ. According to µ, the bank’s threshold is given by (1−µ)αEb. The higher the value of µ, the lower will
be the threshold of the bank, resulting in more securitisation. In fact, whenever bank’s risk-weighted
assets exceed the threshold, the bank computes the amount Sb of risk weighted assets that it want to
sell to the FVC as:
{
Sb = Wb − (1− µ)αEb if Wb > (1− µ)αEb
Sb = 0 if Wb ≤ (1− µ)αEb
We define Lb and Ub as the amount of loans and mortgages in bank b balance sheet. The fraction
of loans (LSb) and/or mortgages (USb) that the bank will securitise and sell to the FVC is computed
as the ratio between Sb and the bank’s risk-weighted assets and is uniformly distributed among bank’s
loans and/or mortgages. In particular, we consider three settings, depending on the type of credit
securitised:
1. Loans Securitisation (LS): Only loans are sold to FVC and securitised:
{ LSb = ( SbWb,L) Lb if Wb,L > Sb
LSb = Lb if Wb,L ≤ Sb
2. Mortgages Securitisation (MS): Only mortgages are sold to FVC and securitised:
{ USb = ( SbWb,U ) Ub if Wb,U > Sb
USb = Ub if Wb,U ≤ Sb
3. Total Securitisation (TS): Both loans and mortgages are sold to FVC and securitised:
LSb =
(
Sb
Wb
)
Lb
USb =
(
Sb
Wb
)
Ub
FVC funds the purchase of loans and mortgages by issuing asset-backed securities (ABSs) and/or
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). The securitised assets are then sold to the mutual fund. This
process allows the bank to free its balance sheet from an amount of risk weighted asstes equal to Sb,
decreasing the amount of Wb and allowing the bank to lend more, according to equations 5 and 6.
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Thus new money can be created in the system by a process that does not involve only the banking
sector but also the financial market through the mutual fund.
Securitization process does not involve only the credit transfer, but also the payment of the related
flows. When the bank securitises credit, it computes the ratio between securitised loans (mortgages)
and total loans (mortgages), i.e. φl =
LSb
Lb and φm =
USb
Ub
. They represent the fractions of loans or
mortgages securitised over the total loans or mortgages held by the bank b. But they also represent
the fraction of interests and principals that the bank will pay to the FVC until the credit involved in
the securitisation is fully paid back by the borrower (or written-off in case of borrower’s bankruptcy).
In turn, the FVC pays interests and principals to the mutual fund. Thus, by purchasing ABSs and
MBSs, the mutual fund grants itself the right to receive the flows of payments of securitised credit.
The equity of the mutual fund is owned by households to whom it pays all the interests in form of
dividends.
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5. Computational experiments
The results are based on Monte Carlo computational experiments, i.e. simulations were run using
different seeds of the pseudorandom number generator for each scenario. We consider three different
settings for securitisation, as explained in section 4:
• Loans Securitisation(LS): Only loans are securitised
• Mortgages Securitisation(MS): Only mortgages are securitised
• Total Securitisation(TS): Both loans and mortgages are securitised
Moreover, we consider four values of µ (0, 15%, 30%, 45%), thus we have a total of 12 scenarios.
Simulations run for a time span of fifteen years and twenty seeds per scenario have been used, for a
total of 240 simulations. We present results using time trajectories, boxplots and averages. Trajectories
are presented only for one seed and for TS scenario; they provide a clear comparison of the different
scenarios accross time. Furthermore, for statistical robustness, a set of boxplots is presented. They
show, for three settings of securitisation (LS, MS, TS) and four values of µ (0, 15%, 30%, 45%), the
distribution of economic and financial variables over the twenty seeds used to initialize the pseudo-
random number generator. Boxplots report time averages and we have considered three time spans,
each of them starting from year three and lasting until the end of year 5, year 10 and year 15. Therefore,
time spans include 2, 8 and 13 years, respectively. In the boxplots, the top of the rectangle indicates
the third quartile, the horizontal line inside the rectangle indicates the median, and the bottom of
the rectangle indicates the first quartile. The vertical line that extends to the top of the rectangle
indicates the maximum value, and another vertical line that extends to the bottom of the rectangle
indicates the minimum value. The points inside the boxplots represent the yearly averages. Finally,
simulations run for a time span of fifteen years, but for the first three years banks are not allowed to
sell credit to FVC, thus there are three years of common transition phase, which we do not consider in
the analysis. Simulation can diverge at the beginning of year 4, when banks can sell credit to FVC and
thus the distinction among securitisation scenarios is enabled. In this way, we have a second twelve-
years period, which is different for each scenario but originates from the same initial conditions. In the
description of results, we refer to credit as the sum of loans and mortgages. In-BS credit represents
the credit accounted in banks’ balance sheet, while off-BS credit is the credit securitised and put off
banks’ balance sheet. Finally total credit represents the sum of in-BS credit and off-BS credit.
5.1. Regulatory capital arbitrage
Figure 1 shows in details the difference between in-BS and off-BS credit. The top panel refers to
in-BS credit. It is evident that higher values of µ lead banks to sell more loans and mortgages and
19
thus the amount of credit in their balance sheet increases less. Credit sold by banks is purchased by
the FVC, transformed in ABSs and MBSs, that correspond to off-BS loans and mortgages, and sold to
the mutual fund (middle panel). The sum of credits in-BS and off-BS sheet represents the total credit
in the economy, shown in the bottom panel.
Figure 2 shows the ratio between off-BS credit over the total credit. The toothed patterns are
determined by the timing of securitisation activation. Every quarter, banks sell credit to the FVC,
increasing the amount of off-BS credit as well as its ratio with respect to the total credit. Among two
quarters, the payments of credit installments decrease the amount of off-balance sheet credit, with the
result of a lower value of the ratio. Higher values of securitisation propensity µ raise the amount of
off-BS credit. It is worth pointing out that, as explained in section 4, also for µ equal to 0 banks can
sell credit (figure 2), but they rarely do it, because their risk-weighted assets are usually lower than
the ceiling. Boxplots in figure 8 show the ratio of off-BS credit and total credit also for the LS and
MS settings, but the ratio is lower with respect to TS setting because only loans or mortgages are
securitised, thus their amount over the total credit does not reach the same level of TS, due to the
possibility that the amount of loans and mortgages in bank’s balance sheet is not enough to fulfill the
securitisation requests in LS and MS scenarios, expecially in the long run.
The amount of off-BS credit has a direct impact on the banks’ regulatory capital. Regulatory
capital refers to the capital that the banks must hold because of regulatory requirements. In our
setting, the value of k is 10%, where k reppresent the capital adeguacy ratio (see equations 5 and 6).
This entails that the ratio between equity and risk weighted assets shall be at least 10%, i.e. banks
can lend an amount of money equivalent to maximum 10 units of equity, that results in a value of α
equal to 10 in equations 5 and 6, being α = 1/k. In our results, we do not show the ratio between
equity and risk weighted assets, but the ratio between equity and credit not weighted for the risk, in
order to have a more intuitive measurement of credit.
Figure 3 shows the ratio between banks’ equity and in-BS credit as well as the ratio between banks’
equity and the total credit. All scenarios present an equity to in-BS credit ratio equal or higher than
the ratio between equity and total credit. This is straightforward since total credit is the sum of in-BS
and off-BS credit. It is worth noting that, with the securitisation enabled, even if banks formally
satisfy the regulatory requirements, the systemic risk exposure of the economy is different.
In fact, figure 3 highlights that the equity to total credit ratio far exceeds the limits that banks
should be subject to. This means that the regulatory capital requirements work (see figure 10),
but banks, through securitisation, are able to avoid the requirements and increase the credit in the
economy, consequently arising the probability of bankruptcies and the systemic risk. Figures 10 and
11 give us more informations regarding the different scenarios. Even if the ratio computed in figure 10
has different values for TS, LS and MS settings, given by different behaviour of equity and credit, it is
20
important to notice that the ratio is higher than 0.1, ecxept from the scenario with µ=45% at year 15,
due to large number of bankruptcies that impact banks’ equity (see boxplots in figure 20). Boxplot
11, istead, shows that the real risk exposure of economy, as measured by the ratio between banks’
equity and total credit, exceed the one allowed by regulatory capital requirements in a more consistent
way for higher lever of µ and higher time spans. Our results show that banks can use securitisation
for regulatory capital arbitrage, in order to create more credit. The use of securitization to avoid
regulatory capital requirements is supported by the literature ( Gimnez Roche and Lermyte (2016),
Ambrose et al. (2005), Efing (2015)). Morevover, the reduction of regulatory capital requirements on
capital and the consequent capacity of banks to supply new loans can change according to business
cycle condition, as we show in the following subsections.
5.2. Credit cycle
Boxplots in figures 12, 13 and 14 show the growth rates of loans, mortgages and total credit,
respectively. We analyzed three time horizons, i.e. from year 3 until the end of year 5, 10 and 15,
that we consider as short run, medium run and long run time periods. Boxplots indicate that loans,
mortgages and credit increase more consistently for high values of µ in the short run. In the medium
and long run, this is not true for the µ=45% scenario. Boxplot 14 confirms that at year 10 and 15,
the growth rate of total credit is higher only for µ= 15% and 30%, while too much securitisation, i.e.
µ=45%, leads to a lower growth rate at year 15. Looking at year-5 analysis, TS setting shows higher
credit growth rates for increasing values of µ. That states that in the first years of economic growth
(see boxplots in figures 16, 17 and 19) without bankruptcies (see boxplot in figure 20), securitisation
improves the economy through the higher amount of loans and mortgages lent by banks. LS and MS
settings also are characterized by higher growth rates for increasing level of securitisation, but do not
reach the level of TS.
Moreover, LS shows higher growth rates compared to MS. We argue that the main reason is due to
the different risk weight assigned to CGPs loans and household mortgages. As pointed out in section
4.2, banks compute the amount of credit to securitise according to the risk-weighted assets that they
want to remove from their balance sheet. Banks compute the risk weight of new loans taking into
account the balance sheet’s debt and equity of CGPs (see equation 4), while risk-weighted mortgages
are computed as the half of the mortgages value. Being the risk weight of loans usually higher than
0.5, mortgages to be securitised in the MS setting may be higher than loans in the LS one. This is
relevant because there is a limit on the securitisation volume, given by the amount of credit in bank’s
balance sheet. In particular, applying the share of securitisation only on loans or mortgages may have
the effect that banks could not securitise the amount required because not provided with a sufficient
amount of loans or mortgages. The consequence is that, in the long run, banks have lower possibility
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to lend due to Basel II/III regulation and no possibility to securitise. The effect is a credit crunch and
a high number of illiquidity bankruptcies 5.
In this work we do not focus on the effects of securitisation on the housing market and on the
demand of ABSs and MBSs. We want to show the effects of different securitisation settings on banks’
balance sheet. In this respect, MS and LS differ only in terms of amount of securitised assets. This
amount can be relevant because, given the same value Sb, mortgages to be securitised in MS are usually
higher than the loans in LS, for the reason explained above. In both cases, banks increase less their
equity (according to µ) when securitisation mechanism starts, because they use the channel of FVC
to lend more (see figure 15). But in the TS and LS settings, banks can bear this situation because
they keep using securitisation channel, increasing the amount of off-BS credit, as shown in figure 8.
In the MS case, instead, banks can not securitise as much as they need because it is possible that
there are not enough mortgages in bank’s balance sheet, expecially in the medium and long run. This
leads an higher number of bankruptcies (figure 20) and worst economic performances (figures 16, 17,
18, 19). We refer to bankruptcies only for consumption good producers, as we have not considered
a resolution mechanism in case of bank’s bankrutpcy. This is not a limitation for our analysis, since
negative bank’s equity simply results in a credit freeze while bank try to rise its equity. A resolution
mechanism would burden on taxpayers and depositors, thus reinforcing the negative economic spiral
that we observe in case of high securitisation propensity and confirming our results. Anyhow, boxplot
15 shows that banks’ equity on average is positive across our simulations.
Business cycle
EURACE model is able to reproduce endogenous business cycles and endogenous crises, see for
instance Raberto et al. (2012). Figure 5 shows real consumption, real investment and bankrupties.
Real consumption is characterised by a growth trend in the long run and recessions of different intensity
followed by recoveries. During a boom period, with high growth rate and nearly full employment, the
pressure on wages increments the unit costs and togheter with an high aggregated demand causes an
increase in the inflation, as shown in figure 6. Consequently, the central bank, that sets the policy
rate following a Taylor rule, that targets the consumption good price, raises the interest rate. Starting
from year 4, securitisation is active and figure 5 shows that in the short run, i.e. at the end of year
5, securitisation propensity influences positively both consumption and investment. In figures 16, 17,
18, 19, focusing on TS, we can see that at the end of year 5, all the yearly growth rates benefit from
higher values of µ.
5The model foresees two cases for bankruptcies, namely illiquidity and insolvency. Illiquidity bankruptcy occurs when
CGP liquidity is not even suffcient to meet compulsory payments, i.e. debt service and taxes. Insolvency bankruptcy is
triggered whenever the equity of CGP becomes negative and therefore involves also loan and equity write-off for lending
bank (see Teglio et al. (2015) for details)
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It is worth noting that the impact of securitisation to the business cycle is mainly twofold:
• Throught the credit cycle, securitisation affects the amount of loans and mortgages lent to the
CGPs and households, influencing investment and consumption.
• Throught banks’ and mutual fund’s profit and their paid dividends to households, increasing
their capital income.
During boom periods, CGPs increase their costs because higher CB rate increases interest rate
payments. CGPs become more fragile (see figure 7) and crises occur when insolvency bankruptcies
of CGPs are large enough to hurt banks equity. This leads to an equity contraction that causes a
credit crunch that affects CGPs possibilities to refinance their debt, hitting economic activity through
bankruptcy chains. Through securitisation activity, banks are able to sell credit to the FVC and thus
avoid the constrains of capital requirements. This leads an increase of credit in the short run (see
figures 12, 13 and 14), due to less banks’ credit rationing. The consequence is an increase of economic
activity, but also higher probability of bankruptcies. In fact, figure 5 shows that, starting from year
8, several bankruptcies occur for the µ=45% scenario. The consequence is a decrease in investments
and thus a brake on growth.
Boxplots 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 show the main economic outputs for 3 time spans and three different
settings: TS, LS and MS. TS scenario shows that in the short and medium-run, i.e. year 5 and
10, real investment level, real consumption and GDP yearly growth rates increase for higher values
of securitisation propensity µ. Results are different in the long run, when the systemic risk arised
by the increased amount of credit lent triggers more bankruptcies that hit banks’ equity and their
lending activity, resulting in more severe downturns, expecially when securitisation propensity µ is
high. However, according to our computational experiments, the best economic performances are
achieved by the setting with µ=15%. A low level of securitisation, according to our simulations, is the
best compromise between growth and financial fragility.
The presented results highlight the relevace of securitisation process for the business cycle and the
possible effects of shadow banking system on the real economy, in line with other studies on this topic.
For instance, Altunbas et al. (2009) show how banks increase their lending activity using securitisation
for regulatory capital arbitrage and point out, using empirical analysis, that this effect is maximised
during economic expansions. We show this aspect since in our results the credit expansion is higher
during the first years, where economic is growing and no crises occurs. Moreover, we show that the
during economic downturns securitisation impacts negatively the busines cycle, expecially for high val-
ues of securitisation propensity. Also Peersman and Wagner (2015) analyse lending, securitisation and
risk-taking shocks and find that securitisation has relevent effects on U.S. business cycle. Furthermore,
Bertay et al. (2016) show the credit composition channel of securitisation, stating that coutries with
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more securitisation on business loans have higher economic growth, as opposed to household mort-
gages. Although we focus on the credit volume channel, we show that securitisation can result in more
investments and thus trigger economic activity, expecially when only firm loans are securitised.
In addition to the related literature, we show that securitisation can have positive or negative effects
on business cycle depending on the securitisation propensity and economic conditions. If securitisation
propensity is low, it can help lending activity without overly exposing the economy, resulting in less
severe economic recessions. An increase in the securitisation propensity, instead, amplifies the economic
performance during growing periods, but leads to deeper economic downturns.
6. Concluding remarks
This work focuses on the study of securitisation impact on credit and business cycles usign an agent
based- stock flow consistent model. For this purpose, EURACE agent-based macroeconomic simulator
has been enhanced with the addition of the securitisation mechanism and new agents, namely financial
vehicle corporation (FVC) and mutual fund (D).
Through securitisation, banks are able to sell loans and mortgages to FVC, that pool them and
issues asset backed securities (ABSs) and mortgage backed securities (MBSs), sold to the mutual fund.
A securitisation propensity (µ) has been introduced in order to study the effects of different degrees of
securitisation. Quarterly, depeding on its value, banks determine the amount of risk-weighted assets
to securitise. Securitisation mechanism impacts the structure of banks’ balance sheet and influences
the credit cycle, due to banks ability to overcome Basel II/III capital requirements.
Computational experiments’ results show that in the short-run securitisation triggers a boom to
the growth, but increases significantly the fragility of the economy in the long-run. The best economic
performance in the short-run is given by the highest values of µ. This is not confirmed in a time
span of 10 years, where scenarios with the highest µ are affected negatively by the fragility of the
banking sector. In the long-run, the best scenario is given by µ=15%, that also shows better results
for all simulations’ time spans compared to the baseline scenario (µ=0), suggesting that a restrained
securitisation can be a benefit for the economy. Higher levels of securitisation propensity, instead,
cause severe crises in the long-run due to the increased financial fragility given by banks’ excessive use
of securitisation, leading to bankruptcies of CGPs and wealth losses of households.
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Figure 1: in-BS credit (top panel), ABSs and MBSs in mutual funds balance sheet (middle panel) and total credit
(bottom panel). Four values of µ are shown: 0, 15%, 30%, 45%.
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Figure 2: Off-BS credit to total credit ratio. Four values of µ are shown: 0, 15%, 30%, 45%.
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Figure 3: Equity to in-BS credit ratio (top panel) and equity to total credit ratio (bottom panel). Four values of µ are
shown: 0, 15%, 30%, 45%.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 150
5
10 x 10
5
pr
iva
te
 d
ep
os
its
 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 150
5
10
15 x 10
4
years
ba
nk
s 
eq
ui
ty
0
15%
30%
45%
Figure 4: Private sector deposits (top panel) and banks’ equity level (bottom panel). Four values of µ are shown: 0,
15%, 30%, 45%.
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Figure 5: Real consumption level (top panel), real investments (middle panel) and number of bankruptcies (bottom
panel). Four values of µ are shown: 0, 15%, 30%, 45%.
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Figure 6: CB policy rate (top panel) and inflation (bottom panel). Four values of µ are shown: 0, 15%, 30%, 45%.
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Figure 7: Firm leverage (debt to equity ratio). Four values of µ are shown: 0, 15%, 30%, 45%.
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Figure 8: Boxplots and means of off-BS credit to total credit ratio, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years), three
typologies of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 9: Boxplots and means of in-BS credit yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years), three
typologies of securitization (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 10: Boxplots and means of banks’ equity to in-BS credit ratio, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years),
three typologies of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
28
0 15% 30% 45%0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Total securitisation
ba
nk
s’ 
eq
ui
ty
 / 
to
ta
l c
re
di
t
 
 
0 15% 30% 45%
Loans securitisation
0 15% 30% 45%
Mortgages securitisation
year 5
year 10
year 15
µ
Figure 11: Boxplots and means of banks’ equity to total credit ratio, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years),
three typologies of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 12: Boxplots and means of total loans yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years), three
typologies of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 13: Boxplots and means of total mortgages yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years),
three typologies of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
29
0 15% 30% 45%
5
10
15
20
25
Total securitisation
to
ta
l c
re
di
t y
ea
rly
 g
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
 (%
)
 
 
0 15% 30% 45%
Loans securitisation
0 15% 30% 45%
Mortgages securitisation
year 5
year 10
year 15
µ
Figure 14: Boxplots and means of total credit yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years), three
typology of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 15: Boxplots and means of banks’ equity, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years, three typologies of
securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 16: Boxplots and means of real consumption yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years),
three typologies of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
30
0 15% 30% 45%
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2 x 10
4 Total securitisation
re
a
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t
0 15% 30% 45%
Loans securitisation
0 15% 30% 45%
Mortgages securitisation
 
 
year 5
year 10
year 15
µ
Figure 17: Boxplots and means of real investment, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years, three typologies of
securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 18: Boxplots and means of capital stock yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years, three
typologies of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 19: Boxplots and means of real GDP yearly growth rate, for three different time spans (5, 10, 15 years, three
typology of securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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Figure 20: Boxplots and means of bankruptcies, for three different time span (5, 10, 15 years, three typologies of
securitisation (TS, LS and MS) and four values of µ (0,15%,30%,45%)
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